Natural and Effective Obfuscation by Head Inpainting by Sun, Qianru et al.
Natural and Effective Obfuscation by Head Inpainting
Qianru Sun1∗ Liqian Ma2∗ Seong Joon Oh1
Luc Van Gool2,3 Bernt Schiele1 Mario Fritz1
1Max Planck Institute for Informatics, Saarland Informatics Campus
2KU-Leuven/PSI, Toyota Motor Europe (TRACE) 3ETH Zurich
{qsun, joon, schiele, mfritz}@mpi-inf.mpg.de
{liqian.ma, luc.vangool}@esat.kuleuven.be
vangool@vision.ee.ethz.ch
Abstract
As more and more personal photos are shared online,
being able to obfuscate identities in such photos is becom-
ing a necessity for privacy protection. People have largely
resorted to blacking out or blurring head regions, but they
result in poor user experience while being surprisingly in-
effective against state of the art person recognizers [14]. In
this work, we propose a novel head inpainting obfuscation
technique. Generating a realistic head inpainting in social
media photos is challenging because subjects appear in di-
verse activities and head orientations. We thus split the task
into two sub-tasks: (1) facial landmark generation from im-
age context (e.g. body pose) for seamless hypothesis of sen-
sible head pose, and (2) facial landmark conditioned head
inpainting. We verify that our inpainting method generates
realistic person images, while achieving superior obfusca-
tion performance against automatic person recognizers.
1. Introduction
Social media have brought about large-scale sharing of
personal photos. While providing great user convenience,
such a dissemination can pose privacy threats on users. It
is essential to grant users an option to obfuscate themselves
out of these photos. A good obfuscation method for social
media photos should satisfy two criteria: naturalness and
effectiveness. For example, putting a large black box over a
person may be an effective obfuscation method, but would
not be pleasant enough to share with friends.
Previous work on visual content obfuscation can be
grouped into two categories: (1) target-specific and (2)
target-generic. Some papers have proposed target-specific
∗Equal contribution.
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Figure 1: Our obfuscation method based on head inpainting
generates much more natural patterns than common tech-
niques like blurring, but still results in a more effective iden-
tity obfuscation against a recognizer.
obfuscations, ones that are specialized against specific tar-
get machine systems, typically relying on adversarial exam-
ples [15, 20]. They yield nearly perfect identity protection
with imperceptible changes on the input, but such a perfor-
mance is guaranteed only against the targetted ones.
On the other hand, target-generic obfuscations change
the actual appearance of the person such that generic clas-
sifier or even humans misjudge the identity. In its most
crude form, commonly used obfuscation methods like black
eye bar, face blurring, and blacking out head are exam-
ples of this type. These common patterns, unfortunately,
are neither visually pleasant nor effective against machine
systems [14]. This paper proposes a head inpainting based
approach to the target-generic identity obfuscation problem.
Generating realistic and seamless head inpainting on so-
cial media photos is hard. Subjects appear in diverse events
and activities, resulting in varied backgrounds and head
poses. Meanwhile, current generative face models are lim-
ited to frontal [2] or strictly aligned faces [10].
We tackle the problem by factoring it into two stages.
First, depending on the input, we detect or generate facial
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landmarks. In particular, when we have access to the orig-
inal image, we detect facial landmarks. However, to keep
our approach versatile, we also address the more challeng-
ing problem of generating facial landmarks from images
that have been already obfuscated e.g. by a blacking out the
face (called blackhead in the remainder of the paper). Then,
conditioned on the face landmarks, we inpaint a realistic
head that blends naturally into the context. We show that the
resulting head-inpainted images mislead machine recogniz-
ers. Note that our method supports cases where the original
face image is not available; existing head-obfuscated im-
ages on the web can be “upgraded” to our privacy enhanced
head inpainting.
Key contributions are: (1) Novel natural, effective obfus-
cation methods based on head inpainting; (2) Novel land-
mark guided image generation approach for both head visi-
ble and blackhead cases in challenging social media photos;
(3) Novel facial landmark generator that effectively hypoth-
esize realistic facial structures and poses given context in
the scenario of blackhead.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we
present related works mainly on identity obfuscation and
image inpainting. Section 3 describes the proposed two-
stage framework in detail. Section 4 evaluates the presented
method in the context of person obfuscation in social media.
2. Related work
Identity Obfuscation A few works from the vision com-
munity have analyzed and developed obfuscation patterns
for protecting private visual content. First, we introduce
a line of work on target-generic obfuscations that are de-
signed to work against generic automatic person recogniz-
ers as well as humans. Oh et al. [14] and McPherson
et al. [12] have analyzed the obfuscation performance of
blacking or blurring faces against automatic recognizers.
They have concluded that these common obfuscation meth-
ods are not only unpleasant but also ineffective, in partic-
ular due to the adaptability of convnet-based recognizers
[14]. More sophisticated approaches have been proposed
since then. Hassan et al. [7] have proposed to mask private
image content via cartooning. Brkic et al. [1] have gener-
ated full-person patches to overlay on top of person masks.
Similarly, we propose an obfuscation technique based on
head inpainting. The key difference is that while [1] gener-
ates persons with uniform poses independent of the context
(fashion photos), we naturally blend generated heads with
diverse poses into varied background and body poses (so-
cial media photos).
For the target-specific obfuscations, Oh et al. [15] and
Sharif et al. [20] have proposed adversarial example based
obfuscation techniques. Pros are that the obfuscation pat-
terns are imperceptible for humans and obfuscation perfor-
mance is superb; cons are that such a performance is only
guaranteed for a few targetted machine systems.
Image inpainting In our work, we propose generative ad-
versarial network (GAN) based method to complete head
regions based on the context. Raymond et al. [26] and
Pathak et al. [16] have also used GANs to generate miss-
ing visual contents, conditioning on the context. However,
both approaches assume appearance and texture similarity
between the missing part and the context. Our approach
can generate head inpainting solely from body and scene
context, without resorting to any information from the head
region. In particular, unlike [26] method which has been
applied to aligned face images, our approach can be applied
to challenging social media setup in which people appear
with diverse poses and backgrounds by taking a two-stage
approach.
Structure guided image generation For generating realis-
tic head inpainting that naturally blends into the given body
pose and scene context, we have conditioned the inpaint-
ing on face landmarks. Some prior work has been devoted
to the structure guided image generation; such a guidance
has proved very helpful for generating images with com-
plex inner structures (e.g. persons) [11, 4, 23, 25, 5, 28].
Ma et al. [11] embed an arbitrary pose into a reference per-
son image, and then refine the output by decoding more ap-
pearance details in the second stage. Alpher et al. [4] use a
similar structure embedding method to generate face image
with detected facial landmarks on well-aligned face dataset.
Walker et al. [23] modeled the possible future movements
of humans in the pose space, and then used the future poses
generated as conditional information to a GAN to predict
the future frames of the video. In [25], Wang and Gupta pro-
pose to first generate a 3D surface normal map from a Gaus-
sian signal and then synthesize images by painting style in-
formation on the map. Ehsani et al. [5] solve the problem of
object occlusion by first predicting the contour of invisible
part then generate the appearance inside this contour. The
second stage replies on the close visibility same as Context
Encoder [16]. Cole and Belanger [2] recently introduce an
approach face warping manipulation using landmark con-
trol on frontal face images. Different with these landmark
works, our approach can not only generate new landmarks
from body context, but also handle the large pose variances
in Flickr images.
3. Head inpainting framework
We propose a context-driven head inpainting approach.
We focus on social media photos which are challenging
due to complex poses and scenarios. To learn an effec-
tive head generator from the data, we need strong guidance
for which we use facial landmarks. Therefore, we factor
the head inpainting task into two stages: landmark detec-
tion/generation and head inpainting conditioned on body
context and landmarks.
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Figure 2 describes the global view of our two-stage ap-
proach. It takes either original or blackhead image1 as in-
put, in order to give flexibility to deal with cases where the
original images are not available. Given original or head-
obfuscated input, stage-I detects or generates landmarks,
respectively. Stage-II takes the blackhead image and land-
marks as input, and outputs the generated image.
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Figure 2: Our two-stage head inpainting framework. The
input of stage-I is either the original or the blackhead image.
The output is the inpainted image.
3.1. Stage-I: Landmark
The overview of stage-I is shown in Figure 3. In the case
of landmark detection, we simply use the detector imple-
mented in python dlib toolbox [8]. The output are 68 facial
keypoints. In the case of landmark generation, the frame-
work contains an adversarial training by Landmark Gener-
ator (GL) and Discriminator (DL).
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Figure 3: Stage-I: Landmark Detection/Generation. The in-
put to detection is the original image Ic, and to generation
are the blackhead image I and head mask M . For the De-
coder in GL, we adopt three versions: the decoder from
scratch (Scratch); from a pre-trained AE (AEDec); from a
pre-trained PDM (PDMDec).
Landmark Generator (GL). GL has an Auto-encoder
structure, and it contains two main parts: Encoder and De-
coder. The Encoder compresses the body/scene context of
1Blurhead image is another important obfuscation, and it is easily
adapted in our approach. We use blackhead image as a default example.
the blackhead image to a latent variable in the bottleneck
layer which is then decoded to landmark coordinates by the
Decoder. In the following, we describe details of the En-
coder and Decoder.
Encoder of GL. The input of Encoder are the black-
head image I and a head mask M which indicates the
head bounding box. Encoder learns from X = [I;M ]
to a latent variable zL. The architecture of Encoder has
6 CONV residual blocks, and the latent variable zL is 32-
dimensional.
Decoder of GL. Taking zL as the input, the Decoder
works for generating the 2 × 68 landmark coordinates L.
Its generic architecture contains 6 FC residual blocks. It
is noted that both Encoder and Decoder in GL are trained
from scratch by default.
Training the Encoder and Decoder from scratch is chal-
lenging in our task, due to diverse body pose and back-
ground clutter in social media photos. Therefore, we also
explore a different route: Instead of simultaneously train-
ing both, we first train a stronger Decoder and fix it, and
then, conditioned on this Decoder, train the Encoder from
scratch. Such a procedure is inspired by knowledge transfer
between deep models trained on different tasks [6, 19]. We
implement this by training encorder/decoder pairs with an
encoding bottleneck for landmark reconstruction for which
the input and output and exactly the same landmark coor-
dinates. During training, the decoder learns the decoding
function from the encoding bottleneck to facial landmark
coordinates. The pre-trained decoder is then fixed and used
as decoder in our landmark generator GL.
Based on different reconstruction methods, we pre-train
two types of networks: the classical Auto-encoder (AE) and
the landmark-specific Point Distribution Model (PDM) [3].
AE decoder (AEDec). Th Auto-encoder reconstructs face
landmarks using an encoder and a decoder through a bot-
tleneck layer. Both coders are fully connected layers with
ReLU activations. L2 loss is used for optimization.
PDM decoder (PDMDec). We are using a Point Distri-
bution Model (PDM) to better represent the 3D pose vari-
ations [3, 27]2. Our landmark points are thus parametrized
using p = [s,R, t, q] to denote the scale, orientation, trans-
lation and non-rigid changes in the following PDM Equa-
tio :
L = s ·R · (L¯3D + Φq) + t (1)
where L¯3D denotes the mean value of 3D landmarks
mapped from our 2D data, Φ the 3×n principal component
matrix, q the n-dimensional non-rigid shape parameters, s
the scaling,R are the first two rows of the 3×3 rotation ma-
trix defined by 3 axis angles and t = [tx, ty] the translation.
2We use the code of [27] to train the PDM model [3]. Non-rigid struc-
ture from motion [22] is used to map 2D points to 3D in this code. Our
training data are the detected landmarks in PIPA TRAIN set.
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Each landmark vectorL is represented by n+6 parameters.
Equation 1 is used as decoder for GL. In the experiments
we use n = 34 principal components to achieve high con-
sistency while allowing for flexibility.
Loss functions of GL and DL. We use L2 loss as well
as adversarial loss for optimization. The adversarial loss is
useful because landmarks trained with only L2 loss show
noisy alignments, which can be easily detected and reme-
died by involving a discriminator. We adopt the DC-
GAN discriminator (CONV layers) [17] because the land-
mark channels represent image spatial structures. Land-
mark coordinates are converted to channels to input to the
CONV layers. The convert function is differentiable. Not-
ing that we have also tried a fully-connected discriminator
with landmark coordinates as input but it has shown only
marginal difference.
For training DL, any landmark generated by GL are la-
beled fake, while we use the detected landmarks as the real
examples. Exact losses are formulated as follows:
LDL =EX∼pdata(X)
[
logDL(X)
]
+
EX∼pdata(X)
[
log (1−DL(GL(X)))
]
, (2)
LGL =EX∼pdata(X)
[
log (DL(GL(X)))
]
+
λL‖(GL(X)−Ld)‖2, (3)
where X is the concatenation of blackhead image I (3
channels) and the head mask M (1 channel). Ld is the de-
tected landmark coordinates (ground truth). λL is a weight
on the L2 loss.
3.2. Stage-II: Inpainting
Stage-II is conditioned on the landmarks and the black-
head (or blurhead) image to generate head pixels and inpaint
the image. As shown in Figure 4, the architecture is com-
posed of Head Generator GH and Head Discriminator DH .
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Figure 4: Stage-II: Head generation. The input are black-
head image I and landmark channels Lh. The generator
has an Auto-encoder structure which encodes the input to a
bottleneck then decodes to a fake image. The discriminator
is the same as in DCGAN [17].
Input. For head generator GH , the 68 landmark heatmaps
Lh are concatenated with the head-obfuscated image I as
input. As the head region is obfuscated, the landmark key-
points guide the pixel generation.
For the input of the head discriminator DH , we fuse the
generated head image with the black head image as fake
and treat the original image as real. Then, we feed the fake,
real pairs into the head discriminator. It is worth noting that
we use the whole body image instead of head regions in
order to generate a realistic image which has natural tran-
sition between head and surroundings including body and
background.
Head Generator (GH ) and Discriminator (DH ). The
head generator GH is a “U-Net”-based architecture [18],
i.e., convolutional Auto-encoder with skip connections be-
tween encoder and decoder to help propagate image infor-
mation directly from input to output. It generates a natu-
ral head image according to both surrounding context and
landmarks. The architecture of the head discriminator is the
same as in DCGAN [17].
Loss function. We use both L1 loss and adversarial loss to
optimize GH and DH :
LDH =EY ∼pdata(Y )
[
logDH(Y )
]
+
Ex∼pdata(Y )
[
log (1−DH(GH(Y )))
]
, (4)
LGH =EY ∼pdata(Y )
[
log (DH(GH(Y )))
]
+
λH‖(GH(Y )− Ic)‖1, (5)
where Y is the concatenation of blackhead image I and
the landmark heatmaps Lh mapped from landmark coordi-
nates. Ic is the original image (ground truth). λH is the
weight of L1 loss3.
4. Experiments
We evaluate the presented two-stage head inpainting
pipeline on a social media dataset in terms of inpainting ap-
pearance and pose plausibility, as well as identity obfusca-
tion performance against machine recognizers. We analyze
the impact of different input types (original, blackhead, and
blurhead) and different choices of decoders and losses for
landmark generation (§3.1).
4.1. Dataset
Since we need to evaluate our method on realistic so-
cial media photos, we use the PIPA dataset [29]. It is the
largest social media dataset to date (37,107 Flickr images
with 2,356 annotated individuals), and contains people in
diverse events, activities, and poses. Each of 63,188 person
instances are annotated with head bounding boxes.
In order to maximize the amount of training data, we
have introduced new training-test splits over PIPA, instead
3Detail architecture and hyper-parameters are given in the supplemen-
tary materials.
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of resorting to existing ones. We split 2,356 PIPA identi-
ties into TRAIN set (2,099 identities, 46,576 instances) and
TEST set (257 identities, 5,175 instances). We have further
pruned both sets with heavy profile or back-view heads, re-
sulting in 34,383 instances in TRAIN and 1,909 in TEST.
The TRAIN set is used for training landmark and head gen-
erators. TEST set is the evaluation set.
Our landmark and inpainting generators take a fixed-size
input (256×256×3). For every training and testing sample,
we prepare the input by first obtaining the body crop. We
follow the procedure in [13]: extend the head box with fixed
ratios (3×width and 6×height), and then resize and zero-
pad the body crop such that it fits tightly in the square 256×
256.
4.2. Scenarios and inputs
Our approach introduced in §3 is versatile and supports
scenarios where the user (who wants to obfuscate an im-
age) has access to the original image or only has access to
already head-obfuscated images (e.g. blacked out). The
necessity for this versatility is that social network service
providers may aim to upgrade the privacy level by obfus-
cating images through blurring or blacking-out heads, even
though it has been shown to be quite ineffective [14].
In order to simulate multiple scenarios, we consider three
types of inputs to our obfuscator: original, blackhead, or
blurhead, where the latter two are common obfuscation
techniques these days. We prepare blackhead and blurhead
inputs following the procedure in [14]. PIPA head box an-
notations indicate the head region to be obfuscated, which
is either filled in with black pixels or smoothed with a Gaus-
sian blur kernel specified in [14].
4.3. Quantitative results
Here, we quantify the intermediate face landmark quality
as well as the obfuscation performance of the final head-
inpainted images.
4.3.1 Landmark
Facial landmarks may be either detected or generated de-
pending on the input type (head visible or not; see §3.1). In
this section, we evaluate the generated landmark quality in
terms of the L2 distance to the detected landmarks (used as
ground truth) and the L2 distance normalized by the inter-
ocular distance [8]. Although detected landmarks are not
perfect, they turned out to be good proxies to the ground-
truth in our preliminary inspection on real face images.
We investigate three axes of factors for our landmark
generator. (1) the input type: original, blackhead, or blur-
head. (2) the loss function: only L2 versus L2 and adversar-
ial loss (DL). (3) the decoder type: trained from scratch, au-
toencoder pretrained (AEDec), or Point Distribution Model
pretrained (PDMDec). A summary of the quantitative re-
sults is given in Table 1 (“Landmark” column). Note that for
the original images, our best landmark generator achieves
an L2 distance of 2.41 on average (not shown in table) –
which gives an upper bound (best-case) on the generated
landmark quality.
Input type. We compare the L2 distance between gener-
ated and detected landmarks for three types of inputs: orig-
inal, blackhead, or blurhead. For original images, we use
detected landmarks, which gives by definition zero L2 dis-
tance. We observe from Table 1 that head-blurred inputs
show consistently closer landmark locations to the detected
landmarks: e.g. 6.32 versus 13.6 for landmark generator
with decoder trained from scratch with L2 loss. Blurhead
images indeed contain structural information about the face
keypoints.
Loss function. We compare two choices of loss func-
tions: only L2 versus L2 + DL. Given a blackhead input
with landmark decoder trained from scratch, using only L2
loss yields the 13.6 distance from the detected landmarks.
Adding adversarial loss DL marginally improves the dis-
tance to 13.0. However, for head-blurred images, the im-
provement due to adversarial loss is much greater (from
6.32 to 4.85).
Decoder. We consider three choices of decoder in the
landmark generator GL: learning from scratch (Scratch),
pre-trained with AE (AEDec), and pre-trained with PDM
(PDMDec). For both blurhead or blackhead cases, condi-
tioning the decoder with either AEDec or PDMDec helps
generating landmarks closer to the detected ones: e.g. for
blackhead input, L2 distance metric improved from 13.0 to
11.7 and 12.3, respectively, although the impact is less dra-
matic than for the type of input.
4.3.2 Inpainting
We evaluate the head generation quality comparing to origi-
nal images (ground truth) using SSIM [24] for whole image
and mask-SSIM [11] for head region only. One simple base-
line of inpainting is using Nearest Neighbor (NN) head4 to
do copy-paste. This ignores the blending with surroundings,
resulting in unpleasant visualization and a quite low SSIM
score of 0.872, lower than all our inpainting results.
4.3.3 Obfuscation
While it is interesting to see how well facial landmarks
can be hypothesize even images where the face is blurred
or blacked-out, a more important question is how well our
inpainting methods can fool automatic person recognizers.
For this, we have taken person recognizer models from [13],
4NN head is searched in training data based on the mean L2 distance
of detected landmarks.
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Table 1: Evaluation of proposed obfuscation methods. We quantify the quality of the proposed obfuscation method against
landmark quality, inpainting quality, as well as obfuscation effectiveness (person recognition rates). We vary the loss (DL
here represents the adversarial loss) and decoder used in our landmark generator (§3.1); the head inpainter is always the GH
+ DH (§3.2).
Obfuscation method Evaluation
Landmark Landmark Inpainting Person recognizer
Input Loss Decoder L2 Norm. L2 SSIM mask-SSIM head body+head head contrib.
Original No head inpainting / / 1.000 1.000 85.6% 88.3% 72.2%
Original NN head copy-paste / / 0.872 0.195 0.8% 4.4% 67.5%
Blur No head inpainting / / 0.931 0.396 52.2% 71.6% 3.2%
Blur Detected landmarks 0.00 0.000 0.962 0.679 27.2% 33.0% 70.8%
Blur L2 Scratch 6.32 0.230 0.954 0.578 21.9% 30.8% 66.8%
Blur L2+DL Scratch 4.85 0.182 0.955 0.586 23.7% 31.3% 66.6%
Blur L2+DL AEDec 4.77 0.180 0.951 0.585 22.9% 31.0% 66.1%
Blur L2+DL PDMDec 4.50 0.168 0.953 0.593 24.1% 31.8% 66.7%
Black No head inpainting / / 0.000 0.000 2.1% 67.0% 14.0%
Black Detected landmarks 0.00 0.000 0.902 0.405 6.6% 15.1% 70.8%
Black NN landmarks 2.48 0.088 0.896 0.332 5.2% 13.6% 71.3%
Black L2 Scratch 13.6 0.501 0.884 0.186 3.4% 11.3% 73.6%
Black L2+DL Scratch 13.0 0.477 0.882 0.191 3.1% 11.5% 71.4%
Black L2+DL AEDec 11.7 0.431 0.885 0.199 3.1% 10.9% 72.5%
Black L2+DL PDMDec 12.3 0.453 0.885 0.196 3.7% 10.9% 71.0%
retrained them on our data-splits to measure the obfusca-
tion performance, in terms of the drop in recognition rate
compared to the non-obfuscated case. We also provide a ra-
tionale for our good obfuscation performance based on the
analysis of the attention of the recognizer.
Person recognizer. We use the social media person recog-
nition framework naeil [13]. Unlike typical face recog-
nizers, naeil uses also body and scene context cues for
recognition. It has thus proved to be relatively immune to
common obfuscation techniques like blacking or blurring
head regions [14].
Following [13], we first train feature extractors over head
and body regions, and then train an SVM identity classifier
on top of those features. We may also concatenate features
from multiple regions (e.g. head+body) to allow it to extract
cues from multiple regions. In our work, we use GoogleNet
features from head and head+body for evaluation of ob-
fuscation performance.
Although we present results against a particular instance
of machine recognition system, the obfuscation method is
target-generic: the head generation is not conditioned on
any particular recognition system. It is thus expected to
work against a generic machine recogniser. We have also
verified that the obfuscation results show similar trends
against AlexNet-based analogues (supplementary materi-
als).
Head inpainting provides good protection. Table
1 shows obfuscation performance (columns head and
head+body). Under no obfuscation, the head+body
recognition performance is 88.3%. Black/blurring baselines
give 67.0%, and 71.6%, respectively – confirming the ob-
servation in [14] that these are ineffective. On the other
hand, our head inpainting methods show < 32% (blurhead
input) and < 12% (blackhead input) recognition rates for
head+body recognizers. They are more effective protec-
tion techniques than blacking or blurring head regions.
Cues used. We compare the recognition rates between
head and head+body. When the recognizer relies solely
on head cues, while the head has been inpainted, then the
recognition rates are lower than the head+body counter-
parts. For example, the last row method against head rec-
ognizer gives 3.7% versus 10.9% for head+body, nearly
reaching the chance level recognition rate (2.1%).
Input type. While having access to blurred head images
help generating more plausible landmarks (§4.3.1) as well
as visually natural head inpainting (§4.4), they may leak
identity information. We compare the recognition rates
when either blurhead or blackhead inputs are used. Our
head inpainting based on blackhead result in 10% ∼ 12%
accuracy, while blurhead based results are in the range
30% ∼ 32% accuracy. This confirms that indeed there ex-
ists a trade-off between plausibility of generated heads and
the obfuscation performance.
Detected vs generated landmarks. While identity infor-
mation may leak through blurred heads, it may also leak
through the landmark detections (face shape). On the other
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hand, generated landmarks enjoys the possibility to come
up with an equally plausible landmark hypothesis but with
different face shapes. For the blackhead input, the detected
landmarks indeed result in higher recognition rate (15.1%)
than generated ones (e.g. 10.9%, last row), with similar
trend for the blurhead cases.
Rationale for good obfuscation – recognizer attention.
We have verified that our head obfuscation scheme exhibits
better performance than commonly used ones like black-
ing and blurring. We give a rationale for this phenomenon
by means of the recognizer attention. Given an input, rec-
ognizer attention refers to the regions in the image where
the recognizer extracts cues from. We hypothesize that
while blacked or blurred heads induce recognizer attention
on non-head regions, our inpainted heads attract attention
on the heads.
For the recognizer attention we have used the gradient-
based mechanism from Simonyan et al. [21]. We first com-
pute the gradient of the neural network prediction with re-
spect to the input image; take maximal absolute values
along the RGB channel; and then smooth with Gaussian
blurring. To quantify the chance of attending on the head
region, we have computed the “head contribution” score by
estimating
head contrib. = P[max attention is inside head region]
over the test samples.
See final column of table 1 for the results. We observe
that while the original image has 72.2% chance of inducing
attention on the head region, blacked or blurred heads are
much less likely to attract the recognizer’s attention (14.0%
and 3.2%, respectively). This explains why head+body is
still performing well: it simply ignores the confusing head
cue. On the other hand, our inpainting-based obfuscation
still attracts the recognizer’s attention as much as the non-
obfuscated head image does (71.0% versus 72.2%). This
indicates that the realism of inpainted heads encourages the
recognizer to still rely its decision on the inpainted head,
effectively leading to misjudgment by the recognizer.
4.4. Qualitative results
Obfuscation patterns should not only be effective against
recognizers, but also look natural for the applicability in so-
cial media. In this section, we visually examine the gener-
ated landmarks and corresponding inpainted heads.
For generating natural heads, landmarks should look like
that of an actual face and be consistent with the body pose.
However, at the same time obfuscation performance bene-
fits from landmarks that do not preserve the original face
shape. In this section, we discuss if our generated land-
marks achieve both realism, while effectively obfuscating
machine recognizers. Qualitative results are given in Figure
5.
Detected versus generated landmarks. Given an origi-
nal image with a visible head, we detect landmarks, while
for blackhead we hypothesize them from regions other than
the head itself. The comparison between columns 2,3 (de-
tected landmarks) and columns 4,5 (generated landmarks)
in Figure 5 illustrates the difference. In all the examples
shown, the detected landmarks closely follow the original
image. On the other hand, the generated landmarks, espe-
cially for blackhead cases, results in landmarks and head in-
painting with different head poses. However, the generated
landmarks are still plausible with respect to the body pose
and activity. Finally, note that by generating landmarks, we
can further mask identity information (recognition rates are
consistently lower for inpainting based on generated land-
marks), while keeping reasonable realism.
Blackhead versus blurhead. Landmarks may be gener-
ated from either blurhead or blackhead images. We visu-
alize how the head information contained in blurred cases
improve the inpainting quality. Columns 2,4 and columns
3,5 in Figure 5 show respective examples for blur and black
cases. Involving blurred head images during landmark and
head generation results in inpainting that resembles the
original head, especially the head pose and hair color/style
(e.g. ID-690). On the other hand, not providing any infor-
mation in the head region results in a significantly different,
yet plausible, head images. In particular, when even land-
marks are generated, the resulting head images are drasti-
cally different from the original one. Such a shift of appear-
ance is reflected in the low recognition rate (10.9%).
5. Conclusion
To address the problem of obfuscating identities in social
media photos, we have presented a two-stage head inpaint-
ing method. Although the social media setup is more chal-
lenging than previous face-generation setups (diverse head
and body poses and backgrounds), our method has proved
to generate both natural and effective obfuscation patterns
that effectively confuses an automatic person recognizer. In
particular, our method is target-generic: the obfuscation is
designed to work against any recognizer, be it human or
machine. Also, the method does not require access to the
original image, enabling to “upgrade” existing obfuscation
patterns to our privacy-enhanced version.
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Supplementary materials
These supplementary materials include additional details
in network architecture (§A) and training (§B), as well as
extended figures and tables: §C and §D introduce extensions
of Figure 5 and Table 1 in the main paper, respectively.
A. Network Architectures
In Figure 6, Figure 7 and Figure 8, we present three ar-
chitectures respectively for the Encoder of Landmark Gen-
erator GL, the landmark Auto-encoder (for pre-training the
AEDec) and the Head Generator GH .
In Figure 8, we should note that the output of the deep
network is the intact image (256x256x3) including the body
and head. It is then post-processed by cropping and pasting
based on the head mask and the blackhead image. There-
fore, in the final output only the head region is generated.
B. Implementation details
Both the landmark generator and head generator are
trained with the Adam optimizer [9] with the weights
λL = 2 (in the main paper Equation (3)) and λH = 50 (in
the main paper Equation (5)). Initial learning rates (for both
generator and discriminator) are 2× 10−5, and it decays to
half every 5, 000 iterations.
For landmark generation models, the minibatch size of
landmark generation models is set to 16; optimization stops
after 10, 000 iterations; each iteration consists of 5 and 1
parameter updates for the generator and the discriminator,
respectively. We have 34, 383 training data in total. There-
fore, it is about 23.3 epoches for training the generator and
4.7 epoches for training the discriminator. For AEDec, we
train the landmark Auto-encoder with the minibatch size 16;
optimization stops after 60, 000 iterations.
For head generation models, the minibatch size of land-
mark generation models is set to 6; optimization stops after
13, 000 iterations; each iteration consists of 5 and 1 param-
eter updates for the generator and the discriminator, respec-
tively. It is about 8.7 epoches for training the generator and
1.7 epoches for training the discriminator.
C. Visualization results
In this section, we show the visualization results using
different landmark generation models, as a supplement to
the Figure 5 of main paper. Specific landmark models are
L2 (L2 loss was used in the Table 1 of main paper) with
Scratch Decoder, L2 +DL with Scratch Decoder, L2 +DL
with AE Decoder and L2 +DL with PDM Decoder.
Figure 9 presents the results with blurhead images as in-
put. In most cases, we achieve the best visual quality as well
as the lowest landmark generation errors using the PDMDec
model.
Figure 10 presents the results with blackhead images as
input. Similar to blurhead results, the PDMDec model con-
tributes to the best visual quality. It is worth to note that the
smaller landmark error (mean L2 distance) do not mean the
better visualization quality. The prediction of face pose and
position depends on the body/scene context in the black-
head case. The quality of the generation is evaluated ac-
cording to the facial organ consistency when the pose and
position are reasonable. The mean L2 distance to the de-
tected landmarks (used as ground truth) is only a reference.
Additionally in Figure 11, we show some examples us-
ing direct copy-paste method, corresponding the “NN head
copy-paste” row in the Table 1 of main paper. Candidate
images are searched in the training data based on the nor-
malized L2 distance between detected landmarks. The face
poses match the bodies in most cases, but the method results
in unpleasant output images.
D. Obfuscation performance against AlexNet
Experiments in the main paper have focused on the ob-
fuscation performance with respect to a GoogleNet-based
recognizer. However, as argued in the main paper, our ob-
fuscation approach is target-generic: it is not generated
with respect to a particular recognition system and is ex-
pected to work against a generic system.
This section additionally shows the obfuscation per-
formance on an AlexNet-based recognizer. We use the
same “feature extraction - SVM prediction” framework as
in the main paper; we replace the feature extractor by
AlexNet. See Table 2 for the quantitative comparison be-
tween GoogleNet and AlexNet recognizers.
The two recognizers exhibit different behaviours. First
of all, on clean images, AlexNet performs worse than
GoogleNet (81.6% < 85.6%), while on head-inpainted im-
ages, AlexNet shows greater robustness (e.g. 24.1% versus
29.9% on “Blur input - L2 + DL - PDMDec”). We also
observe systematically less contributions from the head re-
gion: 72.2% (GoogleNet) versus 66.0% (AlexNet) on clean
images, and consistent drop in head contribution on in-
painted images (20% ∼ 30%). AlexNet predictions are
supported more by non-head regions, at least partially ex-
plaining its robustness against head obfuscation.
Although AlexNet recognizer turns out to behave quite
differently from the GoogleNet model, we still reach the
same conclusion regarding the superiority of our inpainting-
based obfuscation over common patterns like blacking
or blurring. For body+head, our inpainting method
(“Blur/black input - L2 + DL - PDMDec”) decreases the
recognition rate from 67.0% to 30.9% for blurheads, and
from 63.2% to 12.2% for blackheads. Finally, we again ob-
serve that the contribution from head region increases as
our method inpaints realistic head images. This leads to
the same conclusion as for GoogleNet in the main paper:
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Figure 6: The architecture of the Encoder used in Landmark Generator GL.
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Figure 7: The architecture of the Auto-encoder used for pre-training the AE Decoder (AEDec). The pre-trained AE Decoder
will be connected to GL Encoder through the bottleneck layer zL.
inpainted head images direct recognizer attention to head
region, inducing a wrong decision based on the inpainted
head.
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Table 2: Evaluation of proposed obfuscation methods against two person recognizers in terms of person recognition rates.
This table is an extension of the recognition results in Table 1 of the main paper.
Obfuscation method Obfuscation against person recognizer
Landmark GoogleNet AlexNet
Input Loss Decoder head body+head head contrib. head body+head head contrib.
Original No head inpainting 85.6% 88.3% 72.2% 81.6% 85.3% 66.0%
Original NN head copy-paste 0.8% 4.4% 67.5% 0.7% 3.7% 46.2%
Blur No head inpainting 52.2% 71.6% 3.2% 52.0% 67.0% 20.6%
Blur Detected landmarks 27.2% 33.0% 70.8% 32.0% 31.8% 37.2%
Blur L2 Scratch 21.9% 30.8% 66.8% 28.5% 29.8% 36.7%
Blur L2+DL Scratch 23.7% 31.3% 66.6% 29.7% 30.3% 38.9%
Blur L2+DL AEDec 22.9% 31.0% 66.1% 29.1% 30.1% 37.5%
Blur L2+DL PDMDec 24.1% 31.8% 66.7% 29.9% 30.9% 38.0%
Black No head inpainting 2.1% 67.0% 14.0% 2.1% 63.2% 1.7%
Black Detected landmarks 6.6% 15.1% 70.8% 7.8% 15.2% 46.3%
Black NN landmarks 5.2% 13.6% 71.3% 7.0% 13.3% 46.0%
Black L2 Scratch 3.4% 11.3% 73.6% 4.5% 11.0% 49.0%
Black L2+DL Scratch 3.1% 11.5% 71.4% 4.6% 11.1% 47.4%
Black L2+DL AEDec 3.1% 10.9% 72.5% 4.7% 11.5% 48.7%
Black L2+DL PDMDec 3.7% 10.9% 71.0% 4.7% 12.2% 51.2%
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Figure 9: Visualization results on PIPA dataset. The input is blurhead image both for landmark generation and head genera-
tion. Landmark generation error (the distance to the detected ones) is given under each instance.
13
690_72157624907956927_502414
9580.jpg
848_72157627869036624_623383
8021.jpg
EucliDistToGL = 2.25
EucliDistToGTL = 1.91
EucliDis = 3.45EucliDist = 3.24EucliDist = 3.52EucliDist = 
EucliDistToGL = 5.54
EucliDistToGTL = 1.90
EucliDist = 6.86EucliDist = 6.14EucliDist = 10.81EucliDist = 7.67
963_72157629623144215
_6998306231.jpg
EucliDistToGL = 5.58
EucliDistToGTL = 1.76
EucliDis = 6.91EucliDist = 5.77EucliDist = 7.16EucliDist = 
694_72157625003719
517_5079341707.jpg
691_72157624907956927_50241
47816.jpg
600_72157623631904443_44849441
36.jpg
707_72157625208730738_5100996619.jpg
EucliDistToGL = 10.56
EucliDistToGTL = 3.87
EucliDist = 13.77EucliDist = 14.33EucliDist = 17.84EucliDist = 
EucliDistToGL = 1.72
EucliDistToGTL = 2.76
EucliDist = 3.60EucliDist = 3.27EucliDist = 5.19EucliDist = 
EucliDistToGL = 16.05
EucliDistToGTL = 2.20
EucliDist = 7.40EucliDist = 6.58EucliDist = 9.16EucliDist = 
EucliDistToGL = 4.00
EucliDistToGTL = 2.68
EucliDist =5.95EucliDist = 3.09EucliDist = 9.16EucliDist = 
ID: 
690
ID: 
848
659_72157624635635
006_4852051202.jpg
Nearest Neighbor
663_72157624635635006_48
51548043.jpg
690_72157624907956927_502354
0857.jpg
707_72157625208730738_510099
6901.jpg
ID: 663
615_72157623924978078
_4549781344.jpg
ID: 
815
ID: 659
ID: 690
14.40 3.91
15.91 3.39
16.40 4.47
2.73
2.10
ID: 659
ID: 663
ID: 
815 ID: 690
7.07
3.39
ID: 707
ID: 707
659_72157624635635
006_4852051202.jpg
Detected  landmarks
(GT landmarks)
Ground truth
 images
LG + LD LG+LDWith AEDec
LG+LD
With PDMDec Nearest NeighborLG
14.27
663_72157624635635006_48
51548043.jpg
690_72157624907956927_502354
0857.jpg
707_72157625208730738_510099
6901.jpg
ID: 
663
615_72157623924978078
_4549781344.jpg
ID: 
815
ID: 
659
ID: 
690
8.47 10.98 14.40 3.91
15.41 18.28 25.52 15.91 3.39
21.01 21.95 20.73 16.40 4.47
3.61 5.95 2.62 2.73 2.10
ID: 
659
ID: 
663
ID: 
815
ID: 
690
7.92 5.27 5.93 7.07 3.39
ID: 
707
ID: 
707
2.07
1.90
5.53 2.56
2.41
Generated landmarks  (with PDMDec)
Blurhead Blackhead
2.49
Landmark L2: 
Input image:
Generated landmarks  (with AEDec)
Blurhead Blackhead
3.46 10.99
25.523.01
4.21 2.62
Generated landmarks  (with ScratchDec)
Blurhead Blackhead
691_72157624907956927_50241
47816.jpg
ID: 691
ID: 691
3.981.39 2.31 3.97
5.943.01
ID: 663
ID: 659
ID: 690
ID: 659
ID: 663
ID: 690
L2+DL (AEDec) L2 (Scratch)
ID: 691
ID: 691
L2+DL (Scratch)
9.82Landmark L2: 17.03
24.6016.74
3.371.90
4.57 2.84
 L2+DL (PDMDec)Blackhead Image Original Image
659_72157624635635
006_4852051202.jpg
663_72157624635635006_48
51548043.jpg
690_72157624907956927_502354
0857.jpg
691_72157624907956927_50241
47816.jpg
14.40
15.91
2.73
3.98
10.99
25.52
2.62
3.97
Figure 10: Visualization results on PIPA dataset. The input is blackhead image both for landmark generation and head
generation. Landmark generation error (the distance to the detected ones) is given under each instance.
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Figure 11: Visualization results using the direct copy-paste method, corresponding the “NN head copy-paste” row in the
Table 1 of main paper. Candidate head images are searched in the training data.
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